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1. Introduction 
During the years 2003 to 2008, the Irish domestic financial sector experienced a very fast 
and poorly controlled expansion, followed by a dramatic collapse. The causes of the Irish 
credit bubble and bust have been exhaustively examined; see for example Connor et al. 
(2012), Honohan (2010), Nyberg (2011), Regling and Watson (2010) and additional 
references therein. Over the next six years, from late 2008 to 2014, the Irish financial sector 
went through a painful restructuring and slow, modestly successful, recovery. This paper 
provides an economic analysis of the Irish financial sector’s restructuring and recovery 
period. The paper considers both domestic and foreign banks operating in Ireland, 
household and corporate debt, property and other asset markets, and business investment.  
We analyse what the Irish experience tells us about the economic theory of post-crisis 
financial sector restructuring and recovery strategies. 
One can divide recent Irish economic history into three periods: the “Celtic Tiger” period of 
strong export-led economic growth from about 1990 to roughly 2003; the “financial bubble” 
from 2003 to early September 2008, and the “austerity period” from mid-September 2008 
to December 2014. For our purposes, the appropriate start date for the austerity period is 
clear: on September 15th, 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, interbank borrowing 
markets froze, and the global credit-liquidity crisis began in earnest. The emerging 
difficulties in Ireland’s financial and property markets were evident to some observers as 
early as mid-2007, but it was only after the September 2008 failure of Lehman Brothers that 
the true magnitude of the Irish financial crisis was widely recognised.  
On 30th September 2008, following meetings on the previous night between senior 
government officials, representatives of the Irish banks, the Department of Finance and the 
Central Bank1, the Irish government decided to guarantee all the liabilities of the Irish 
domestic banking sector. This extravagant act created a perilously large contingent liability 
of €440 billion for the Irish taxpayer, more than double Irish GDP. The Irish domestic banks 
effectively changed from private enterprises to sickly wards of the state. For the next six 
years, the restructuring of the financial sector in Ireland was one of the key goals of public 
policy. 
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Section 2 describes the key imbalances in the domestic financial system at the beginning of 
the restructuring-recovery period. Section 3 considers the sale and liquidation of distressed 
loan portfolios of the banks, particularly by the National Asset Management Agency. Section 
4 examines banking sector recovery strategies, including the Financial Measures 
Programme, a collection of directives imposed on the domestic banks by the Irish Central 
Bank to guide them toward more acceptable levels of capital adequacy and stable liquidity 
funding. Section 5 describes the explosive growth and slow retrenchment of Irish household 
and business debt, and the related problem of loan payment arrears and default. Section 6 
concludes the paper. The paper is organised thematically rather than chronologically; Table 
1 below gives a guide to the chronology of some of the key events. 
Table 1: Chronology of Key Events 
2. Imbalances in the Domestic Banking Sector 
This section examines the key imbalances in the Irish domestic banking sector, which arose 
during the 2003-2008 credit bubble period and slowly dissipated thereafter. The 2003-2008 
Irish growth-and-collapse episode is a classic example of a credit-fuelled property bubble 
and bust. Calvo et al. (1993, 1994) and Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) note that financial 
bubbles are often linked to large inflows of foreign capital. Such inflows are called “capital 
bonanzas” and they are often, but not always, linked to financial bubbles and busts.2  
During the years 2003-2008, Ireland experienced a spectacular capital bonanza. The 
domestic banking sector in Ireland grew explosively, with a total growth of assets of 245% 
over a five a half year period, equivalent to 25% per annum. This was not financed from 
domestic sources; rather, the funding was borrowed from overseas via the interbank 
borrowing market, bank bond market, and via foreign corporate deposits in Irish domestic 
banks. Figure 1 gives the asset (Panel A) and liability (Panel B) composition of the aggregate3 
balance sheet of the domestic banking sector.4 On the asset side, the very fast growth of 
property development lending is notable – it grew5 by 502% between Q1 2003 and Q3 2008. 
Mortgage lending also grew quickly, by 172% over the same period. On the liability side, the 
growth in net foreign borrowing is critical to explaining the banking crisis: it grew by 353% 
over this same five and half year period. In September 2008, the Irish domestic banks had 
€113 billion of net foreign liabilities, equivalent to 63% of 2008 GDP. The growth of more 
stable sources of bank funding, such as domestic demand deposits, is more muted. 
Figure 1: Composition of Domestic Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Linked to the growth of bank lending was a construction boom and property price bubble. 
Figure 2 shows a residential property price index, which grew by 311% between Q1 1996 
and its peak in Q1 2007; it subsequently fell 51% to its trough in Q1 2013. Also, it is worth 
noting that residential property prices understate the magnitude of the property price 
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bubble, which was even more spectacular for development land. Ireland does not have a 
statistical index of development land prices.  
 Figure 2: Residential Property Price Index 
 
3. Sale and Liquidation of Distressed Loan Portfolios 
At the beginning of 2009, the Irish banking system, and the Irish government as guarantor of 
that system, was in a deep, existential crisis. The Global Great Recession had begun, with 
the worst four consecutive quarters of worldwide economic contraction since the beginning 
of the Great Depression in 1929; see Almunia, et al. (2009).  Although the government 
liability guarantee provided some short-term relief, serious funding problems continued to 
plague the Irish banking sector. 
3.1 The Nationalisation and Liquidation of Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide 
The two most distressed Irish domestic banks were Irish Nationwide and Anglo Irish Bank. 
Within a few months of the September 2008 bank liability guarantee it became obvious that 
both banks were essentially in the process of liquidation, although at first there was some 
hope that a rump institution might survive. Irresponsible corporate governance policies and 
accounting irregularities were discovered at both institutions; the extremely poor quality of 
their loan books also became evident quickly. In January 2009, the Irish government 
nationalised Anglo Irish bank with a view to an orderly wind-down of its operations. Later, in 
July of 2011, Irish Nationwide was also officially nationalised after merging with Anglo Irish 
bank to form the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC).6 This institution was finally 
declared bankrupt, and liquidated, in February of 2013.  
The ECB stood ready to provide liquidity funding to Eurozone banks, but only if backed by 
eligible collateral assets. The institutional bank run against Anglo Irish was so severe that it 
did not have sufficient eligible collateral to obtain adequate emergency funding from the 
ECB. In the absence of suitable collateral, there was an additional fall-back source of central 
bank liquidity. The ECB council had an extra funding channel by which it could allow direct 
lending from the bank’s member-state central bank (i.e., the Irish Central Bank) to individual 
banks, in a programme called Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA). The risk from any 
potential default on ELA lending by the bank falls on the member central bank (i.e., the Irish 
Central Bank) rather than on the ECB. Since the Irish Central Bank is guaranteed by the Irish 
sovereign, Irish Central Bank ELA lending adds to Irish sovereign risk. 
By March of 2010, Anglo Irish bank had few unimpaired assets available for collateral for 
liquidity funding from either the ECB or Irish Central Bank. Anglo Irish Bank was very clearly 
insolvent by this date. The ECB was reticent to allow a Eurozone bank to enter bankruptcy 
during this tumultuous period for the Eurozone financial system. The Irish government did 
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not have the fiscal resources to pay the creditors of Anglo Irish Bank. A compromise deal 
was struck between the ECB, Irish government and Irish Central Bank. The Irish government 
gave a so-called “promissory note” to Anglo Irish Bank, promising to pay the bank (or its 
creditors) €30 billion plus interest over a twenty-year period. This promissory note was then 
accepted by the Irish Central Bank as collateral for “liquidity funding” under ELA (this 
acceptance was pre-agreed as part of the deal). Neither the Irish Central Bank nor the ECB 
could directly bail-out Anglo-Irish Bank since this would represent debt monetisation, which 
is forbidden under the ECB charter. (Examined critically, this liquidity assistance could still be 
interpreted as indirect debt monetisation since in effect the Irish Central Bank was creating 
new money for a member government unable to fund its claims, or rather for the claims of 
its private bank liability holders.)  
The promissory note deal was widely criticised within Ireland since it involved Irish 
taxpayers taking on additional debt to pay off the private creditors of a failed bank. Unlike 
the capital injections into the surviving banks, where the Irish populace clearly benefitted 
from the banks’ survival, Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide were in full-scale liquidation 
and the injected money was used only to pay off private bank liabilities.   
The valuation of the promissory note deal is quite subtle due to the budgeting relationship 
between the Irish Central Bank and Irish government: the Irish Central Bank’s investment 
surplus including interest earned is paid to the Irish government. See Whelan (2012) for a 
careful valuation analysis of the promissory note. The promissory note deal was made even 
more byzantine on the bankruptcy of IBRC in February of 2013. As part of the IBRC 
bankruptcy, the Irish government announced that it was altering the payment structure of 
the promissory note, replacing the note with long-term government bonds. Due to the 
circularity of interest payments between the Irish Central Bank and Irish government, this 
debt swap substantially lowered the true cost of the debt to the Irish government; see 
Whelan (2013). In an unusual move, the ECB governing council did not approve or 
disapprove of this change in the terms of the deal, rather, it announced that it “took note” 
of the changed terms, without endorsing or rejecting the change. The promissory note 
drama is a minor but fascinating episode in the evolving history of the Eurozone financial 
system.  
3.2 The National Asset Management Agency 
The nationalisation and planned liquidation of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide still left 
unanswered the question of the best solution for the other, surviving domestic banks. 
Bacon (2009) in a report commissioned by the National Treasury Management Agency 
proposed solutions to the domestic bank sector’s credit and liquidity crisis. The report 
evaluated options for resolving property loan impairments and associated capital adequacy. 
The Bacon Report considered three alternative approaches: 
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1. A recapitalisation programme, which injects sufficient capital into the banks to 
absorb likely losses; 
2. An asset guarantee scheme which would see the state guarantee the loan assets 
which would remain on bank balance sheets; and 
3. An asset management arrangement which would remove the assets from the banks 
and place them in a separate vehicle. 
The first approach (1) is least disruptive to the activities of the banks, since the bad loans 
remain under the banks’ direct control, but the approach risks the banks becoming “zombie 
banks” which focus only on dealing with past bad lending decisions and not engaging in new 
lending. The guarantee scheme (2) has the advantage of not creating the need for the state 
to finance the purchase of the assets or for the banks to write down their asset values.  This 
has the disadvantage that it creates misaligned incentives for banks and borrowers since the 
taxpayer is liable for loan losses. The report argued for the bad bank approach (3). It 
concluded: “when considered in the context of characteristic features of the Irish situation, 
in particular taking account of the contingent liability aspect; the implications of loans 
remaining on bank balance sheets and the continuing capital requirements of property 
related projects, it appears that the Asset Management approach has the potential to offer 
greater assistance to achieving resolution of the impairment issue upfront and maximising 
taxpayer returns, over the longer term” (Bacon, 2009; p.6). 
The National Asset Management Agency (Nama) was established in December 2009. In a 
report outlining its functions (National Asset Management Agency, 2010) Nama’s founding 
goal is stated as striving to achieve the best possible return for the taxpayer on the acquired 
assets. At inception it was given a target to liquidate its entire portfolio (through loan run-
downs, loan sales, and the sale of underlying collateral) within a 7 to 10 year period. 
The government faced challenges in correctly pricing the loan assets to be transferred from 
the banks to Nama. The government had to ensure that the prices paid were “fair value,” 
not containing a hidden subsidy to the selling banks, since an over-priced sale would 
constitute a national government subsidy to private industry; such subsidies are not 
permitted (or very circumscribed) under EU competition law. At the same time, the 
government was aware that if the loan pricing was low, the realised loss on the sale of these 
loans could devastate the banks’ capital bases.  The government took a compromise 
position, in which the loans were fairly valued by an objective outside party, and then a 
premium was added to this current-market valuation, to take account of the loan’s long-
term holding value. The approach was approved by the EU competition commission under 
the circumstances. In retrospect, the Nama loan pricing policy seems to have been about 
right. By the end of 2014, Nama had unwound the majority of its portfolio with a small 
profit margin. 
During 2009, as Nama was being developed and launched, the Irish government was in the 
midst of a fiscal crisis. The government could not afford the additional borrowing required 
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to fund Nama’s purchase of loan assets. It was crucial that Nama borrowing be treated as 
off-balance-sheet funding by national income accounting authorities; this meant that Nama 
had to satisfy criteria to be designated a privately-controlled corporate entity rather than a 
government agency. Such a designation would ensure that the money borrowed to fund 
Nama would not be recorded as Irish sovereign borrowing. The ownership structure of 
Nama consisted of a 51% stake owned by private investors and the remainder held by the 
Irish state. Originally, the private stake was equally divided among three domestic investors, 
namely; New Ireland Assurance, Irish Life Investment Managers, and Allied Irish Banks 
Investment Managers. However the holding of the latter two entities had to be sold off 
when the Irish government became the majority shareholder in their parent banks. One 
share was bought by a South African firm, Prestige, with the other being acquired by an 
undisclosed client. 
Ninety-five percent of the amount which Nama paid for the transferred property loans was 
paid with Government-guaranteed securities. These so-called “Nama bonds” paid a floating 
rate of interest tied to the Libor rate and were deemed to be eligible collateral for obtaining 
funding from the ECB.  The participating Irish domestic banks, who received the Nama 
bonds in exchange for distressed loan assets, were able to convert the Nama bonds to cash, 
courtesy of the ECB lending facility. The very low interest rate on Nama bonds, together 
with their eligibility as collateral for extremely low-rate bank funding from the ECB, had the 
effect of creating a hidden borrowing-rate subsidy for Nama and the participating banks 
from the ECB. These funding subsidies did not violate EU competition laws. The remaining 
five percent of Nama funding was in the form of subordinated securities and equity, which 
allowed the entity to qualify as a private enterprise, not a government agency.  
Nama acquired the first tranche of loans from the participating institutions (AIB, Bank of 
Ireland, Anglo Irish Bank, EBS and Irish Nationwide) in May 2010. Over the following two 
years, it acquired approximately 12,000 loans with a par value of €77 billion for €30 billion. 
Hence, the participating banks suffered a par-value loss of €47 billion on the sale of the loan 
assets. Table 2 shows the composition of the Nama portfolio by loan type and region. 
Table 2: Composition of the Nama Loan Portfolio 
By the end of 2014, Nama had redeemed €16.6 billion of senior bonds, 55% of the total 
senior debt originally issued (see National Asset Management Agency, 2015b), which placed 
it over two years ahead of its target redemption schedule (with an original target of 50% 
redemption by 2016). Nama is essentially an asset-disposal business with a limited lifespan, 
so its aggregate profitability depends critically upon the sale prices received on asset 
disposals over coming years. As of end-2014, Nama seems on target to terminate with a 
modest positive profit (see National Asset Management Agency, 2015a). 
Nama was aided by three external factors: one, it had an extremely valuable borrowing 
subsidy provided by its indirect access to cheap ECB funding; two, it was able, as intended in 
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its design, to take a long-term holding strategy for most assets and “ride out” the poor 
market conditions of the first few years after its establishment; and three, it was indirectly 
aided by the quantitative easing and monetary expansion policies of the US, British and 
Eurozone central banks, which pushed down long-term interest rates to historic lows for 
long periods. These low long-term rates in all three currency zones (US dollar, British pound, 
and euro) made the potential yields on Nama’s property portfolio very attractive to outside 
investors.   
4. The Recovery Strategy for the Surviving Domestic Banking Sector 
4.1 The EU-IMF-ECB Program and Bank Sector Stabilisation 
As of the last quarter of 2010, the Irish government’s attempts to restore the domestic 
banking system to health had not succeeded. Despite the nationalisation of Anglo Irish and 
several government-funded capital injections into banks, the markets remained 
unconvinced that the banking system was stabilised. Increasingly, wholesale deposits and 
bank bonds in domestic institutions began to be withdrawn on maturity, despite being 
protected by the Government guarantee (Central Bank of Ireland, 2011; p.3). During this 
period, the Irish banking sector absorbed an enormous quantity of liquidity support from 
the Irish Central Bank and ECB (€136 billion at peak in November 2010). Particularly 
troubling were the ELA funds provided by the Irish Central Bank (see Figure 3). These funds 
were guaranteed by the Irish government, but the ECB began to worry about the credit 
quality of this guarantee.  The sharp economic downturn in Ireland following the banking 
collapse induced a very large Irish fiscal deficit, exacerbated by the high costs of capital 
injections into the banks. The ECB put pressure on the Irish government to enter an IMF-led 
sovereign borrowing and restructuring programme. The Irish government agreed to enter a 
programme in November 2010. There were three agencies involved in running the 
programme: the IMF, EU and ECB, aptly named “the Troika.”  
Figure 3: Liabilities of the Irish Central Bank  
The collapse of the Irish banking system caused the fiscal failure of the Irish sovereign and 
necessitated the sovereign bail-out programme. This order of causality (banking crisis 
causing fiscal crisis) was not the case uniformly in the Eurozone crises; for some financially-
troubled countries in the Eurozone, the opposite causality applied. Greece’s financial crisis, 
for example, began with a fiscal crisis, which then spread to the banking system. One of the 
design weaknesses in the single currency area was this perverse interaction between 
banking and fiscal uncertainty –the so-called “doom loop” of interconnected banking sector 
and sovereign crises in the Eurozone monetary system, see De Grauwe (2013).  
The Troika set the restoration of confidence in the banking system as one of the key goals of 
the programme. The Troika required €10 billion be immediately invested in the banks and 
8 
 
set aside a further €25 billion as a contingency sum to address potential future capital 
needs. 
4.2 Bank Sector Stress Tests 
The establishment of Nama, and the transfer of distressed property loans to it from the 
banks, generated a €47 billion realised capital loss for the domestic banks. The Irish 
government and Irish Central Bank, together with the Troika, were forced to develop and 
implement a strategy to restore capital adequacy and public confidence in the Irish banking 
sector.  
For several years after the 2008 U.S. credit-liquidity crisis, a lack of confidence in the 
banking sector was widespread in the developed world, not just in Ireland. In an attempt to 
restore confidence in European banks, the Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS) 
undertook a stress test in 2009. The test was applied to the 22 largest banks in Europe 
based on their balance sheet at the end of 2008 and projected the capital position of the 
banks two years forward. The test claimed to show that all the banks in the sample were 
adequately capitalised to withstand the assumed stresses. In July the following year, CEBS 
repeated the stress test, now covering 91 banks over the two-year period until the end of 
2011. Bank of Ireland and AIB were included in the sample and both passed the test, while 
seven non-Irish banks failed. The credibility of the stress tests was called into question 
when, just months after passing the 2011 stress test, a number of banks, including Dexia 
and Bankia, required substantial restructuring.   
The CEBS stress tests of European banks had inconsistent goals, which may explain their lack 
of credibility. Their main objective was to restore confidence in European banks; producing 
a test finding that there were few if any serious problems in the region’s banks could 
contribute to this goal, if the test finding was believed. CEBS had the authority to 
recommend capital injections or restructuring of failing banks, but was aware that making 
such recommendations, without any obvious sources of new capital, might cause funding 
chaos. The resulting tests were eventually seen as a failed public relations exercise rather 
than a serious attempt to measure bank sector stability.   
Starting in March 2010, the Central Bank of Ireland undertook its own stress tests, the 
Prudential Capital Assessment Review (PCAR). It had learned from the public criticism of the 
CEBS stress tests and was very careful and explicit about ensuring the rigour of the tests. 
The PCAR exercise was preceded by a forensic asset quality review of all the domestic 
banks. Then, the participating banks were required to develop pro forma bank losses (and 
capital positions) linked to a base-case scenario and worst-case scenario for key loss-linked 
variables such as property prices and interest rates. In March 2010, Bank of Ireland, AIB and 
EBS, the three surviving institutions which had sold loans to Nama, were subjected to PCAR. 
The PCAR covered a three-year period, 2010-12, and set a target level of 8% Core Tier 1 
capital in the base case scenario and a 4% target in the stress scenario. Permanent TSB 
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undertook the PCAR in September that year. The PCAR was repeated the following year, this 
time supervised by BlackRock Solutions and covering the period 2011-13. The target level of 
Core Tier 1 was raised to 10.5% in the base scenario and 6% in the adverse scenario. Arising 
from the tests, all four institutions, AIB, Bank of Ireland, Permanent TSB and EBS, were 
deemed to require additional capital. 
Prior to 2008, the traditional approach to bank risk regulation focussed upon capital risk 
with considerably less attention to liquidity risk. The US credit-liquidity crisis had made 
regulators more conscious of the importance of liquidity risk, in addition to capital risk. 
Reflecting this change in approach, the Irish Central Bank undertook a Prudential Liquidity 
Assessment Review (PLAR) as a supplement to the PCAR. The PLAR focused on trying to put 
the banking sector on a more stable funding structure. The purpose was to shrink the 
banking sector’s dependence on volatile sources of bank funding, particularly short-term 
wholesale and interbank borrowing, which was also mostly foreign-sourced funding. This 
was to be either replaced by stable funding sources, such as domestic deposits, or more 
realistically, matched by an offsetting shrinkage in the banks’ assets.   
4.3 The Financial Measures Programme 
The Financial Measures Programme (FMP) was the collection of directives to the domestic 
banks based on the outcomes from the PCAR and PLAR tests. Although prepared by the Irish 
Central Bank, the FMP represented the banking element of the Troika rescue package. There 
were two main recommendations of the plan, capital injections and funding rebalancing, 
corresponding to the output from the PCAR and PLAR risk measurement tests.  
The Financial Measures Programme required new capital injections into the banks; the 
capital amount needed was well within the funds allocated in the Troika support 
programme. The more difficult part of the FMP was the need for funding rebalancing in 
response to the PLAR findings. The PLAR set a clear target for the banks: each of the banks 
individually needed to reach a loan-to-deposit ratio of 122.5% by December 2013. The 
purpose of this target was to return the Irish banks to a more appropriately leveraged and 
more stable funding position. To ensure smooth progress towards this 2013 target, the FMP 
also set interim six-monthly targets for the loan-to-deposit ratio. 
The need to shrink assets in order to eliminate volatile funding created a difficulty in the 
PLAR recommendations. Forcing the banking sector to shrink its assets might incentivise the 
sector against new lending, which in turn might starve the economy of investment and 
lengthen the economic downturn. Selling the banks’ existing assets was also problematic. 
The market for bank loan assets seemed poor at the time that the PLAR was undertaken. 
There was a risk that any forced sale of bank assets might attract “fire sale” prices and 
generate bigger than necessary capital losses for the banks.   
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The FMP shaped the deleveraging plan to minimise disruption to domestic bank lending and 
to avoid fire sales of assets. Banks were required to divide their existing lending operations 
into “core” activities (chiefly, domestic lending) and “non-core” (chiefly, foreign lending). 
The banks were then tasked with deleveraging by shrinking the non-core business while 
focussing solely on core activities for future lending growth.  
The FMP forecast that losses of €27.7 billion would be incurred on bank portfolios and a 
further €13.2 billion of losses would arise from sales of non-core portfolios. This produced a 
capital shortfall of €18.7 billion, to which Irish Central Bank added a €5.3 billion 
conservatism buffer, creating a requirement for a €24 billion capital injection. 
5. Corporate and Household Debt Overhang and Deleveraging 
Section 2 looked at the explosive growth in bank lending through analysis of the banking 
sector balance sheet. This section returns to the same phenomenon, but now from the 
perspective of the borrowers: Irish households and businesses.  
Figure 4 shows the growth and then decline of Irish household and private enterprise debt 
as a proportion of annual GDP. The run-up of household debt before 2008 was mostly but 
not entirely due to the fast growth in mortgage lending during the bubble period. To a 
considerable extent, the fast increase in private enterprise debt during the credit bubble 
was also due to property-related lending. During the Irish credit bubble, Irish private 
enterprises were very active as part-time property investors, both for commercial properties 
and buy-to-let investment properties; see McCann and McIndoe-Calder (2014). Because of 
this, the collapse in property values created a very large unrealised capital loss for many 
Irish private enterprises. This large property investment loss, together with a sharp drop in 
business activity throughout the economy, contributed to widespread business distress and 
a lack of new investment by Irish businesses. 
Figure 4: Household and Private Enterprise Debt to GDP Ratios  
Figure 5 presents a breakdown by sector of the recipients of credit from Irish banks. It 
illustrates the banking sector’s increasing exposure to property development and 
construction firms over the pre-crisis period, 2003-2008. By 2008, it represented 
approximately 60% of the combined banking loan book to private enterprises – a twenty 
percentage point increase over the start of our sample. This imbalance is still evident at the 
end of 2014, but the trend is toward a more stable ratio of property and construction debt 
to other sources of bank debt.  
Figure 5: Sectoral Breakdown of Irish Bank Lending 
The large cumulative increase in property prices and mortgage debt prior to 2008, followed 
by the sharp fall in property prices after the banking crisis, led to an enormous increase in 
negative equity for mortgage holders, in both the primary residence and buy-to-let 
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categories. This negative equity, together with increasing unemployment and household 
income falls, led to a very sharp increase in mortgage arrears. Figure 6 shows the default 
rates (that is, percentage of mortgages with arrears of 90 days or more) for residential and 
buy-to-let mortgages.  
Figure 6: Default Rates of Residential and Investment Mortgages 
Widespread mortgage default is conventionally followed by property repossession, but this 
was not the case in Ireland after the banking crisis.  Soon after the banking crash, in 2009, 
the Irish government enacted the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 which 
inadvertently had the effect of making most repossession proceedings impossible following 
the discovery of an error, a “lacuna” in legal jargon, by Ms Justice Dunne in July of 2011. The 
judiciary ruled that the law as written and passed by parliament legally banned virtually all 
repossessions in most circumstances. Although not the stated intention of the law, the 
blanket ban on repossession was politically convenient at the time, and the law was not 
amended to correct the “lacuna” for almost two years. Eventually, under intense pressure 
from the Troika, amending legislation was passed in 2013, allowing repossession of 
defaulted properties.  In any case, repossession rates remained extremely low in Ireland 
throughout the recovery period so far; see Figure 7. This is one financial sector imbalance 
which has not yet been resolved as of 2014; there is still a large overhang of defaulted 
mortgages, with only slow and limited progress toward reducing this overhang. 
Figure 7: Repossession Rates for Defaulted Mortgages 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
During the period from late 2008 to the end of 2014, the Irish financial sector undertook a 
slow and painful restructuring and recovery from the financial excesses of the 2003-2008 
Irish credit bubble. During the credit bubble, the domestic banking sector had grown 
extremely quickly, building up a large, narrow exposure to property-related lending. The 
banks had financed this excessively fast growth using unstable sources of foreign funding. 
After the banking crash of September 2008, Irish policymakers were faced with a banking 
sector with massive prospective losses due to failed property loans and an urgent need to 
replace quickly-disappearing foreign funding. At the same time, the Irish household and 
business sectors were threatened by an overhang of property-related debt whose 
underlying collateral value had dropped precipitously. The economy suffered a deep 
recession, while the government entered a fiscal crisis due to falling tax revenues and 
unsustainable spending levels. 
Policymakers implemented a range of corrective measures. A large quantum of property 
development loans were moved to a dedicated “bad bank” called the National Asset 
Management Agency (Nama). An IMF-EU-ECB financial rescue package was negotiated, 
mostly to deal with the government’s fiscal crisis, but also to provide capital infusions to the 
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domestic banking sector. A forensic analysis of banks’ loan books was undertaken by the 
Irish Central Bank, followed by a stress test of their capital levels and funding stability. This 
in turn led to a series of Irish Central Bank directives to the domestic banking sector 
requiring substantial new capital infusions and a slow rebalancing of funding (mostly by 
shrinking the size of the banking sector asset base) toward more stable funding ratios.    
Given the dire initial conditions of late 2008, the restructuring and recovery of the Irish 
financial sector has proceeded reasonably well. Nama seems on course, if conditions remain 
favourable, to liquidate its portfolio by the original target date and with a modest profit. The 
banking sector has regained the confidence of the domestic and international financial 
community, restored safe capital ratios, and made progress toward a stable funding model. 
Only the problem of long-term arrears on property debt in the household and small 
business sector remains mostly unresolved.  
During the latter part of the period, the restructuring and recovery process was aided by 
foreign events favourable to the plan. In response to the Great Recession, the central banks 
of the U.S.A., U.K. and Eurozone set interest rates at unprecedentedly low levels; the U.S. 
and U.K. central banks also undertook quantitative easing programs, buying up long-term 
assets in order to revive their financial systems.  These conditions helped to make the loan 
assets of the Irish banking system tempting for foreign purchasers.  
The European Central Bank was criticised in Ireland for its preference for domestic bank 
capital support (funded by the Irish government) as opposed to allowing private-sector Irish 
banks to fail. On the other hand, some of the actions of the ECB were instrumental in the 
eventual recovery of the Irish financial system. It provided an enormous amount of funding 
support, both directly and through the Irish Central Bank, pushing the limits of its charter in 
terms of the ban on any indirect financial support for member governments. With hindsight, 
the insistence of the ECB that the Irish government accept an IMF-EU-ECB support package 
was the correct decision, and it helped to restore confidence in the Irish financial system. 
The low financing rate provided to Nama and the participating banks by the EU and ECB 
contributed to the profitability of the Nama business strategy.   
The poor performance of Irish business leaders, politicians and financial regulators during 
2003-2008, when they allowed the Irish credit bubble to inflate unchecked, damaged 
Ireland’s business reputation. The restructuring and recovery period was long and painful, 
but its relative success may have repaired some of the reputational damage arising from the 
Irish credit bubble and financial crash. 
Were enough new safeguards put in place during the restructuring and recovery period to 
ensure a similar credit bubble cannot occur again in Ireland? The answer is yes: the type of 
credit bubble and bust which devastated the Irish economy is extremely unlikely to re-occur 
in the new regulatory environment. The Basel III bank regulations include restrictions on the 
ratio of net stable funding to risky lending, and this restriction rules out the fast-growth 
13 
 
strategies used by the Irish banking sector during the boom (which relied on volatile, foreign 
funding vehicles such as interbank borrowing as the main sources of liability growth). 
Additionally, the risk regulation of the Irish domestic banks is now overseen by the ECB, and 
the ECB-based regulators would not allow any bank to adopt a narrow, unbalanced 
exposure to property development lending as was done by several Irish banks during the 
bubble. The Irish Central Bank has also changed drastically, taking a much stricter and more 
cautious approach to financial risk regulation.        
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1
 Lyons (2014) provides a detailed account of those meetings on 29 September 2008. 
2
 Using a large panel dataset, Calvo et al. (1994) estimate that a capital bonanza (suitably defined) increases 
the probability of a national banking crisis in the following year by a factor of seven. 
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3
 The aggregate balance sheet of the domestic banking sector is found by summing the asset and liability 
entries of each domestic bank and cancelling intra-bank items such as interbank lending from one bank to 
another within the domestic banking sector.  See Central Bank of Ireland (2013) for details. 
4
 All data used in the charts and figures in this paper is available at 
https://www.maynoothuniversity.ie/economics-finance-and-accounting/working-papers. 
5
 This statistic refers to domestic property development only. Including foreign property development (most of 
which was led by Irish-based developers) gives an even larger growth figure; see Connor and O’Kelly (2010). 
6
 It could be argued that Irish Nationwide was already nationalised upon receiving a capital injection of €5.4 
billion from the Irish government in 2010, which gave majority shareholding to the state.  
   
Table 1: Chronology of key events 
Lehman Brothers file for bankruptcy September 2008 
Irish government guarantee of bank liabilities September 2008 
Anglo Chairman and CEO resign after revelation of loan scandals December 2008 
Chief Executive of the Financial Regulator, Patrick Neary, resigns January 2009 
Irish government announce nationalisation of Anglo Irish bank January 2009 
Garda Fraud squad raid Anglo Irish buildings February 2009 
Government announce €7bn capital injection for BOI and AIB February 2009 
CBI launch first version of code of conduct on mortgage arrears  February 2009 
S&P downgrade Irish sovereign debt; loss of AAA-rating March 2009 
Government propose establishment of Nama April 2009 
Nama established December 2009 
CBI and Financial Regulator publish methodology for PCAR exercise; 
Results for AIB, BOI and EBS 
March 2010 
Anglo Irish bank announce largest loss in Irish corporate history March 2010 
Anglo and INBS Promissory Notes issued March 2010 
First tranche of loans transferred to Nama May 2010 
CEBS announce results of EU-wide stress tests July 2010 
Second tranche of loans transferred to Nama August 2010 
PCAR results for IL&P  September 2010 
Ireland agrees bailout programme with Troika November 2010 
Bulk transfer of remaining loans to Nama December 2010 
CBI announces Financial Measures Programme results March 2011 
Anglo announce loss of €17.7bn for year 2010 –  a new record March 2011 
Moodys cut ratings on all Irish banks to junk status April 2011 
Creation of IBRC – merger of Anglo and INBS July 2011 
Irish deal to replace promissory notes with long-dated bonds March 2012 
Personal Insolvency Act becomes law December 2012 
Liquidation of IBRC February 2013 
Ireland complete return to bond markets March 2013 
Anglo Tapes released June 2013 
CBI launch fourth version of code of conduct on mortgage arrears July 2013 
Ireland exits Troika bailout programme December 2013 
Bank of Ireland is first Irish bank to announce return to profit August 2014 
 
 
  
 Figure 1: Composition of Domestic Banking Sector Balance Sheet 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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Composition of Assets 
PD - Property Development - domestic only 
RM - Residential Mortgages - domestic 
BO -  Foreign Assets 
DO - Other Domestic Assets 
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Composition of Liabilities 
Eurosystem Borrowing 
EQ - Equity 
DI - Domestic Institutional Borrowings 
DD - Domestic Deposits 
FB - Foreign Borrowings 
 Table 2: Composition of Nama Portfolio by Asset and Region 
 
Ireland Dublin 
Northern 
Ireland Britain 
Rest of 
World Total 
% of 
Nama 
Office 2.66 2.44 0.22 2.10 0.27 5.25 16.5% 
Retail  2.91 1.51 0.22 1.16 0.15 4.44 14.0% 
Other Investment 2.41 1.30 0.34 1.23 0.50 4.48 14.1% 
Total Investment 7.98 5.25 0.78 4.49 0.92 14.17 44.6% 
Residential 3.70 2.31 0.13 1.29 0.16 5.28 16.6% 
Hotels 0.93 0.56 0.01 1.81 0.28 3.03 9.5% 
Total Completed 12.61 8.12 0.92 7.59 1.36 22.48 70.7% 
Development 1.13 0.52 0.06 1.33 0.33 2.85 9.0% 
Land 4.17 2.42 0.28 1.85 0.16 6.46 20.3% 
Total L & D 5.30 2.94 0.34 3.18 0.49 9.31 29.3% 
Grand Total 17.91 11.06 1.26 10.77 1.85 31.79 100.0% 
        
% of Nama  56.3% 34.8% 4.0% 33.9% 5.8% 100.0%  
Source: ‘About Nama’ Information Guide. Available at http://www.nama.ie/publications 
Note: Unless indicated, figures are in billions of Euro 
 
  
Figure 2: Residential Property Price Index: 1996 – 2014 
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Figure 3: Liabilities of the Central Bank of Ireland Relative to GDP 
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Figure 4: Household and Private Enterprise Debt to GDP Ratios 
   
0.00% 
20.00% 
40.00% 
60.00% 
80.00% 
100.00% 
120.00% 
Ja
n-
04
 
Ju
n-
04
 
N
ov
-0
4 
Ap
r-
05
 
Se
p-
05
 
Fe
b-
06
 
Ju
l-0
6 
De
c-
06
 
M
ay
-0
7 
O
ct
-0
7 
M
ar
-0
8 
Au
g-
08
 
Ja
n-
09
 
Ju
n-
09
 
N
ov
-0
9 
Ap
r-
10
 
Se
p-
10
 
Fe
b-
11
 
Ju
l-1
1 
De
c-
11
 
M
ay
-1
2 
O
ct
-1
2 
M
ar
-1
3 
Au
g-
13
 
Ja
n-
14
 
Ju
n-
14
 
Household Debt / Annual GDP NFC Debt / Annual GDP 
Figure 5: Sectoral Breakdown of Irish Bank Lending 
(excluding Financial Intermediation) 
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Figure 6: Default Rates of Residential and Investment Mortgages 
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Figure 7: Repossession Rates for Defaulted Mortgages 
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